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COMMENTS
TOBACCO UNDER FIRE: DEVELOPMENTS IN
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO CIGARETTE
SMOKING INJURIES
"It's the damnedest thing I ever heard of."*
For over two decades consumers have sued tobacco manufacturers, for
deaths and injuries allegedly caused by using tobacco products.2 Tobacco
* Overheard, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1986, at 25 (tobacco heir John D. Reynolds' re-
sponse to his brother Patrick's membership in the American Lung Association's antismoking
campaign).
1. All of the reported cases have been brought against cigarette companies, although
manufacturers of other tobacco products are increasingly being sued for harms allegedly
caused by using their products. See, e.g., Mintz, Tobacco Company is Cleared: Jury Decides
Snuff Didn't Cause Death, Wash. Post, June 21, 1986, at G1, col. 6. This Comment will
concentrate on suits brought against cigarette manufacturers.
2. Each year cigarette related illnesses result in the deaths of approximately 350,000
Americans and 1,000,000 persons worldwide. Blasi & Monaghan, The First Amendment and
Cigarette Advertising, 256 J.A.M.A. 502 (1986). Three main categories of diseases are associ-
ated with cigarette smoking: cancers, cardiovascular diseases, and chronic obstructive lung
diseases. See Koop, Preface to UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE LUNG Dis-
EASE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at xiii (1984) [hereinafter 1984 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT]. Cigarette smoking is a leading cause of cancers of the lung, oral cavity,
larynx, and esophagus. Brandt, Foreword to UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL, at v (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
Smoking contributes to the development of cancers of the kidney, pancreas, and bladder, id.,
and has been linked to cancers of the stomach and cervix. Id. at vii. Smoking increases the
risks for several cardiovascular diseases, principally coronary heart disease. Brandt, Foreword
to UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CON-
SEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL, at iv (1983) [hereinafter 1983 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. Smoking also increases
the risks for sudden cardiac death, stroke, and other cardiovascular diseases, such as arterio-
sclerotic peripheral vascular disease and aortic atherosclerosis. Id. at v-vi. Cigarette smoking
is the primary cause of chronic obstructive lung diseases, including chronic bronchitis and
emphysema. Brandt, Foreword to 1984 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra at vii. About
130,000 of the annual smoking related deaths in the United States are attributable to cancer,
170,000 to coronary heart disease, and 50,000 to chronic obstructive lung disease. See id. at
vii-viii. The Surgeon General has determined that "cigarette smoking is the chief, single,
avoidable cause of death in our society and the most important public health issue of our
time." See Koop, Preface to 1984 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra at xiii.
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companies, thus far, have defeated every attempt to hold them liable.3 In
the late 1950's and early 1960's smokers brought a group of unsuccessful
claims against cigarette manufacturers based on several theories, including
breach of warranty and negligence.4 These law suits failed because of both
adverse legal rulings and the expense of litigation.5 In the last few years
smokers have filed a second group of claims based on new legal theories.6 In
these recent cases plaintiffs have challenged the adequacy of the health warn-
ings on tobacco product packages7 and the advertising practices of the to-
bacco industry.' At present, the federal courts are divided over whether
plaintiffs may bring claims under these legal theories. 9
On the legislative side, Congress has demonstrated concern with the
3. The tobacco industry has never lost or settled a product liability case. This success in
defending product liability suits is unmatched by other consumer product manufacturers. See
Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423
(1980). Nevertheless, tobacco manufacturers have been held liable for injuries caused by for-
eign objects found in their products. See id. at 1425.
4. E.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (breach of implied warranty under Louisiana law); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328
F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (breach of implied warranty of reasonable fitness for intended use under
Missouri law); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.) (breach of im-
plied warranty of fitness for use under Louisiana law), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (breach of implied warranty of fitness
for use under Florida law), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (negligent failure to warn and breach of implied
warranty of fitness for use under Pennsylvania law); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956) (fraud by false advertising under Massachusetts law), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 875 (1958); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.
1972) (product liability under Pennsylvania law), aff'd without opinion, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
5. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1425 (manufacturer's victories resulted from favorable
legal rulings and "tenacious defense work"); Jakobi, Cigarette Manufacturers' Liability After
Cipollone: Gone Up in Smoke?, THE BARRISTER, Summer 1986, at 10 (the "wave of law suits"
filed in the 1950's-1960's "foundered either under the weight of adverse court decisions or the
expense of litigation").
6. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986) (negligent
failure to warn under Massachusetts law), appeal docketed, No. 86-1525 (1st Cir. May 5,
1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (product
liability under Tennessee law), appeal docketed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984) (strict liability, negligent failure
to warn, intentional tort, and breach of warranty under New Jersey law), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
7. See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 184; Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1172; Roysdon, 623 F.
Supp. at 1190.
8. See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 184; Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
9. Compare Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 181 (holding that federal statute preempts state law
claims challenging the adequacy of health warnings on cigarette packages and the advertising
practices of cigarette manufacturers) and Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1189 (holding that federal
statute preempts actions based on alleged inadequacy of health warnings on cigarette pack-
ages) with Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1171 (holding that federal statute does not preempt com-
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health effects l and social cost 1 of smoking since 1965. In that year Con-
gress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act;' 2 thus
establishing a comprehensive federal program to regulate cigarette labeling
and advertising.' 3 Since then, congressional regulation of cigarette and
other tobacco product labeling and advertising has become increasingly vig-
orous." The Act prohibits advertising cigarettes on radio and television"
and requires the familiar Surgeon General's Warnings to appear on cigarette
packages. 16 In addition, the Act contains a section prohibiting states from
requiring any statement relating to smoking and health, other than the Sur-
geon General's Warnings, to appear on any cigarette package. ' This section
also bars states from imposing any requirement or prohibition under state
mon law claims challenging cigarette manufacturer's advertising practices or adequacy of
warnings on cigarette packages).
10. See supra note 2 (discussing the health effects of smoking).
11. Estimates show that, in the United States, medical care and lost productivity costs
attributable to cigarette smoking total about $65,000,000,000 annually. Blasi & Monaghan,
supra note 2, at 502. Moreover, "in 1985 the United States health care system spent an esti-
mated $22,000,000,000 to treat smoking related diseases, of which the Federal Government
paid about $4,200,000,000, while lost productivity costs due to smoking related illness and
premature death were $43,000,000,000." H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(12) (1986); cf
Tribe, Anti-Cigarette Suits: Federalism With Smoke and Mirrors, THE NATION, June 7, 1986,
at 788 (smoking related losses total $80,000,000,000 annually).
12. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter the Act].
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (congressional statement of policy and
purpose).
14. As originally enacted in 1965, the Act required the following label on cigarette pack-
ages: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970). In 1970 Congress increased the strength of this notice to read: "Warning: The Sur-
geon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." 15
U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). In 1984 Congress amended the Act to require that more explicit health
warnings appear on cigarette packages, print advertisements, and outdoor billboards. 15
U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. III 1985). Federal regulation of cigarette advertising now in-
cludes a ban on advertising cigarettes on radio and television. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). A bill
introduced in the 99th Congress in the House of Representatives, if enacted, would prohibit
advertising cigarettes and other tobacco products in newspapers and magazines, on billboards,
in motion pictures, and through sample giveaways. See H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); see also generally infra note 77.
Other tobacco products are also subject to congressional labeling and advertising require-
ments. In February 1986 Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Ed-
ucation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4401-4408
(West Supp. 1986)). This act is similar to the cigarette labeling act in that it requires warnings
of adverse health effects to appear on smokeless tobacco product packages and in advertise-
ments for such products. Id. § 4402(a)(l)-(2). The smokeless tobacco act also prohibits adver-
tising smokeless tobacco on television and radio. Id. § 4402(f).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
16. Id. § 1333 (Supp. III 1985).
17. Id. § 1334(a) (1982).
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law concerning the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes labeled with
the required Surgeon General's Warnings. 8 In recent cigarette smoking in-
jury cases manufacturers have argued that by allowing plaintiffs to recover
tort damages based on theories of inadequate warnings and misleading ad-
vertising practices, the states indirectly would be imposing additional re-
quirements on manufacturers in violation of the Act."9
This Comment examines recent judicial action in response to the high so-
cial cost of tobacco use by first addressing the legal theories that plaintiffs
employed against tobacco manufacturers from the 1950's to the 1960's. It
then examines the evolution of federal legislation regulating cigarette label-
ing and advertising. The Comment next explores the legal theories that con-
sumers have used against tobacco manufacturers in the 1980's and considers
a recent split in the federal circuits over the acceptance of these new theories
of manufacturer liability. This Comment concludes that plaintiffs should be
permitted to present to juries state law claims based on cigarette labeling and
advertising.
I. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN THE
1950's-1960's
From the late 1950's to the early 1960's smokers filed claims against ciga-
rette manufacturers under a variety of legal theories2 ° including breach of
express21 and implied22 warranty and negligence.2 3 Tobacco companies de-
18. Id. § 1334(b).
19. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 4.
21. An express warranty is any factual statement concerning "the quality or character of
goods sold, made by the seller to induce the sale, and relied on by the buyer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979). The Uniform Commercial Code sets forth the general statu-
tory law governing warranties on the sales of goods. Under the U.C.C., an express warranty is
a warranty made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, and is created as
follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978). To create an express warranty, it is not necessary that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that the seller have a specific intention to
create a warranty, but a representation merely of the value of the goods or a statement merely
of the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. Id. § 2-
313(2).
22. An implied warranty is a promise arising by operation of law. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979). Implied warranties include implied warranties of
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fended these suits by generally denying the charges against them and by rais-
ing the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence.24 The breach of warranty claims frequently were based on the
manufacturers' advertisements. 25 In one case, for example, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant's advertisements praised the healthful and harmless
nature of its brand of cigarettes.26 Tobacco manufacturers' omission of any
warning to consumers of the health risks associated with smoking formed
the basis of the negligence claims.2 7
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,2" the plaintiff brought suit
based upon the defendant's negligent failure to warn of the risk of disease
and its breach of express warranty.29 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the breach of warranty ac-
tion and granted the manufacturer's motion for a directed verdict on the
negligence claim, stating that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence of
merchantability, whereby the seller warrants that the goods sold are reasonably fit for the
general purposes for which they are sold, U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978), and implied warranties of
fitness for a particular use, whereby the seller warrants that the goods sold are suitable for the
special purpose of the buyer. Id. § 2-315.
23. In a negligence action, liability is based on the defendant's failure to use the level of
care that a reasonably prudent and careful person would have used under the circumstances.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 1965)
(defendant denied allegations in complaint and pleaded assumption of risk as to each allega-
tion), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987, modified per curiam, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1964) (manufac-
turer pleaded a general denial, expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, contributory
negligence, and assumption of risk). See generally Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to
Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961)
(alleged warranties appeared in advertisements published in newspapers and magazines stating
that defendant's cigarettes were not harmful).
26. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 466 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
27. See, e.g., Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 299 (plaintiff attempted to prove manufacturer could
have foreseen danger of smoking cigarettes and therefore had a duty to warn consumers of
danger and to advise proper precautions).
28. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), remand rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modifled per curiam, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
29. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for loss of his right lung
from cancer allegedly caused by smoking the defendant's cigarettes. Pritchard, 295 F.2d at
294. The plaintiff based the breach of warranty claim on the defendant's alleged violation of
the Pennsylvania Uniform Sales Act. Id. at 296 n.3. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
represented through advertisements that smoking the defendant's cigarettes would not ad-
versely affect the nose, throat, and accessory organs. Id. at 296-97.
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the defendant's negligence. 30 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that sufficient
evidence existed of a causal connection between Pritchard's lung cancer and
his smoking the defendant's cigarettes to require the district court to submit
to the jury the issues of the defendant's negligence31 and breach of implied
and express warranties. 32 Although the court stated that the facts supported
both an express and an implied warranty claim, 33 the plaintiff dropped the
implied warranty claim at the retrial.34
On retrial, the jury found that Pritchard's cancer resulted from smoking
but that the manufacturer was not negligent in failing to warn Pritchard of
the risk of contracting cancer and had not expressly warranted its product.35
The jury also determined that Pritchard had assumed the risk of injury by
smoking the defendant's cigarettes. 36 The Third Circuit, however, reversed
the jury's finding of assumption of risk, holding that it was not supported by
the evidence because it did not appear that Pritchard knew or had notice of
the harmful effects of smoking cigarettes.3 7 Having already established cau-
sation, the plaintiff might have proven liability on an implied warranty the-
ory had he not chosen to terminate the case.38 Pritchard's outcome was the
most favorable one for consumers during this period 39 as the plaintiff was
able to establish causation and only had to prove liability on an implied
warranty theory to succeed.
The "longest and most nearly successful"' attempt to hold a tobacco
manufacturer liable for injuries allegedly caused by cigarette consumption
30. Id. at 295. The plaintiff produced five medical experts in an attempt to establish the
causal relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Id. at 294-95.
31. Id. at 300.
32. Id. at 296-97.
33. Id. at 296.
34. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 1965). See
Garner, supra note 3, at 1427.
35. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 485. The court later amended its opinion to state that the plaintiff need not
relitigate the issue of causation because the jury decided that issue in the second trial. Pritch-
ard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1966). The court, however,
would have required the plaintiff to relitigate liability and damages. Id. at 96.
38. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1427-28. The plaintiff claimed that proving liability was
an "insurmountable" problem. Id. The appellate court stated, however, that "the facts sup-
port[ed] both a warranty of merchantability and fitness for use, i.e., that Chesterfield cigarettes
were reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking without causing physical injury."
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961). Thus, it appears
from the court's statement that the plaintiff could have succeeded in establishing liability based
on a breach of implied warranty theory.
39. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1427.
40. See id. at 1423.
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occurred in Green v. American Tobacco Co.41 In Green, the plaintiffs were
the family of a smoker who died from lung cancer.42 After determining that
smoking the defendant's cigarettes caused the decedent's cancer, the jury
found the defendant not liable because the defendant could not foresee the
harmful effects of tobacco.43 While the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the manufac-
turer," it certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether
the manufacturer must have known of the danger of its product to be held
liable for injuries caused by using the product.45 The state court answered in
the affirmative,46 and in response, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, hold-
ing that sufficient evidence existed to submit to a jury the issue of whether
the cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for human consumption.
47
At the second trial, the jury again rendered judgment for the manufac-
turer.48 The Fifth Circuit again reversed, holding that Green was entitled to
rely on the manufacturer's implied assurances that cigarettes were reason-
ably fit for their intended purpose, and thus the manufacturer could be held
strictly liable for Green's death.49 On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit
41. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), con-
formed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), remand rev'd and
remanded, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
42. 304 F.2d at 71. The plaintiffs originally asserted six theories of liability: breach of
implied warranty, breach of express warranty, negligence, misrepresentation, battery, and vio-
lation of various federal statutes. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida upheld the manufacturer's motion for a directed verdict on all but the breach of
implied warranty and negligence counts. Id.
43. Id. at 71-72.
44. Id. at 76.
45. Id. at 86.
46. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169, 170-71 (Fla. 1963). The Supreme
Court of Florida stated that under Florida law "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge
or opportunity for knowledge of a defect or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his
liability on the theory of implied warranty." Id. at 170.
47. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 943 (1964). Although the first jury found that smoking the defendant's "Lucky
Strike" brand of cigarettes caused Green's lung cancer, see Green, 304 F.2d at 71-72, the Fifth
Circuit refused to reverse the trial court's instruction at the second trial that Green's family
would have to prove that the cigarettes presented a "common danger to the general public as
distinguished from Mr. Green." See Green, 391 F.2d at 102. In other words, the court re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove that Lucky Strike cigarettes "endangered" more smokers than
Green alone to prevail on a breach of implied warranty of fitness for use theory. Id. See also
Garner, supra note 3, at 1427.
48. Green, 391 F.2d at 99. Under the Fifth Circuit's previous opinion, the only issue at
the second trial was whether Lucky Strike cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for
human consumption. Id. at 101. The parties were barred from relitigating the previously
established facts that Green died from lung cancer and that cigarettes caused his cancer. Id.
49. Id. at 106.
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overruled its reversal and reinstated the judgment in favor of the manufac-
turer, concluding that cigarettes were not defective but were reasonably fit
for human use even though a significant portion of the population might
develop cancer from smoking.5" The United States Supreme Court denied
plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari51 and thus ended the longest and
most complex 52 cigarette product liability trial to date.
Three cigarette product liability cases alleging breach of warranty were
lost by plaintiffs because they could not prove the cigarette companies could
have foreseen the harmful consequences of smoking. In Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 53 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the jury's verdict for the defendants, finding that a smoker's
widow had no actionable claim against two cigarette manufacturers for
either negligence or breach of implied warranty because the state of medical
knowledge was such that the manufacturers could not have known that their
products might cause cancer.54
In Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 55 a case similar to Lartigue, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's
50. See Green, 409 F.2d at 1166. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court for the rea-
sons set forth in Judge Simpson's dissent in the second remand. Id. In finding cigarettes not
defective, Judge Simpson stated:
We are not dealing with an obvious, harmful, foreign body in a product. Neither do
we have an exploding or breaking bottle case wherein the defect is so obvious that it
warrants no discussion. Instead, we have a product (cigarettes) that is in no way
defective. They are exactly like all others of the particular brand and virtually the
same as all other brands on the market.
Green, 391 F.2d at 110.
51. Green, 397 U.S. at 911.
52. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1423. The Green litigation lasted twelve years and in-
cluded six appeals and two jury trials. Id.
53. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). The plaintiff sued two ciga-
rette companies for the death of her husband, alleging that he contracted cancer from 55 years
of smoking the defendant's cigarettes. Id. at 22. The plaintiff testified that her husband was a
two-pack-a-day smoker and a "cigarette fiend." Id.
54. In approving the trial court's jury instruction that an implied warranty does not apply
to substances in manufactured products, the "harmful effects of which no developed human
skill or foresight can afford," id. at 23, the court stated:
Thus far, public policy has not decreed absolute liability for "the harmful effects of
which no developed skill or foresight can avoid." At this point, it cannot be said that
cigarette smokers who started smoking before the great cancer-smoking debate relied
on the tobacco companies' "warranty" that their cigarettes had no carcinogenic ele-
ment. Today, the manufacturer is not an insurer against the unknowable.
Id. at 39-40.
55. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). The plaintiff, who smoked at least two packs of cirgarettes
per day, sued a cigarette manufacturer on theories of breach of implied warranty, negligence,
and fraud by false advertising alleging that smoking caused his cancer. Id. at 5.
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entry, after a jury trial, of judgment for the manufacturer.56 Like the Fifth
Circuit in Lartigue, the Eighth Circuit held that a manufacturer's implied
warranty that its product is reasonably fit for its intended use applies only to
foreseeable harmful effects.5 7 Finally, in Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.,5" the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in
favor of the manufacturer5 9 because the plaintiffs failed to prove the foresee-
ability of the hazards of cigarette smoking.'
In addition to breach of warranty and negligence actions, one plaintiff
brought suit based on fraud. In Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,6 1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment for the defendant. The First Circuit held that the plain-
tiff's complaint established a cause of action for fraud arising out of the
defendant's allegedly having advertised that its cigarettes were "healthful"
and "harmless to the respiratory system. ,62 On remand, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the company's mo-
tion for summary judgment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that it made the alleged representations. 63 The First Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding because the plaintiff did not produce the
advertisements in question."
The last reported case65 filed between the 1950's and 1960's was Albright
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 6 6 In Albright, the court did not address the
merits of the plaintiff's claim against the cigarette company because the
plaintiff had already settled a suit against a municipality in which he alleged
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 8-13.
58. 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In Hudson, a cigarette smoker's family
sued a tobacco company alleging that he developed cancer of the lungs and larynx from smok-
ing the defendant's cigarettes. Id. at 541.
59. Id. at 542. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings on the basis of
Lartigue. Id.
60. Id.
61. 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), on remand, 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd per
curiam, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958). In Cooper, a woman sued to
recover damages for the pain, suffering, and death of her husband from lung cancer allegedly
caused by smoking the defendant's "Camel" brand of cigarettes. Id. at 171, 173 n. 1.
62. Id. at 173-74 & n. 1. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant advertised in newspapers
that "20,000 doctors say that 'Camel' cigarettes are healthful" and that the defendant adver-
tised on television and radio that "'Camel' cigarettes are harmless to the respiratory system."
Id. at 173 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
63. Cooper, 158 F. Supp. at 25.
64. Cooper, 256 F.2d at 466. The company's uncontradicted affidavits denied the exist-
ence of any such advertisements. Id.
65. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1423 n.3.
66. 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
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his lung cancer resulted from an automobile accident.67
II. STATUTORY LAW DEVELOPMENT: THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE
LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
In the product liability lawsuits filed against cigarette companies in the
1980's, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant manufacturers negli-
gently or intentionally failed to adequately warn them of the hazards of
smoking and advertised their products in a manner that rendered ineffective
those warnings actually given.68 In answer to these allegations, cigarette
manufacturers have raised the defense that the Act precludes state tort
claims based on labeling and advertising. Congress passed the Act in 1965
in "response to a growing awareness among members of federal as well as
state government that cigarette smoking posed a significant health threat to
Americans.", 69 As amended in 1970, section 1331 of the Act contains a dec-
laration of legislative intent 70 that indicates that the congressional purpose
was twofold-to inform consumers of the health risks of smoking and to
ensure uniformity of cigarette labeling.71
To carry out this policy Congress required, under section 1333, that the
67. Albright, 350 F. Supp. at 344-47. In Albright, the plaintiff sued a tobacco manufac-
turer alleging that smoking the defendant's cigarettes caused his lung cancer. Id. at 344. After
filing this action, the plaintiff settled a suit against the City of Pittsburgh for injuries he re-
ceived when his car hit a street excavation. Id. at 343-44. In the suit against the city, the
plaintiff claimed he developed lung cancer as a result of the accident. Id. at 344. The court
held that settlement of the suit against the city precluded the plaintiff from maintaining the
suit against the tobacco manufacturer. Id. at 344-47.
68. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984),
rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-
563).
69. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 184.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
71, Id. Section 1331 read:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a com-
prehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with re-
spect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazard-
ous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes;
and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect
to any relationship between smoking and health.
In 1984 Congress amended paragraph one of § 1331 to include a reference to health warnings
in cigarette advertisements as well as on cigarette packages. Paragraph one currently states:
"(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smok-
ing by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of
cigarettes .... " Id. § 1331(1) (Supp. III 1985).
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following notice appear on cigarette packages: "Caution: Cigarette Smok-
ing May Be Hazardous to Your Health.",72 In 1970, Congress altered the
notice to read: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cig-
arette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health. '73  In 1984, Congress
amended the Act to require that one of four more explicit health notices
appear in rotation on cigarette packages. 74 The 1984 amendments to the
Act also require that various rotational warnings appear on all print adver-
tisements75 and outdoor billboards. 76 The Act further provides that ciga-
rettes may not be advertised on radio or television.7 7 It gives the Federal
72. Id. § 1333 (1970).
73. Id. § 1333 (1976).
74. Section 1333(a)(1) currently provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to
bear, in accordance with the requirements of this section, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Dis-
ease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result
in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Id. § 1333(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Compare id. with 15 U.S.C.A. § 4402(a) (West Supp. 1986)
(rotational warnings required on smokeless tobacco product packages). See infra note 86.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
76. Id. § 1331(a)(3).
77. Id. § 1335 (1982). In 1971, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a district court
case upholding the federal statutory ban on radio and television advertising of cigarettes. See
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1000 (1972); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 4402(f) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting television and
radio advertising of smokeless tobacco products).
In addition to the current ban on radio and television advertising of cigarettes, a bill intro-
duced in the 99th Congress in the House of Representatives proposes to ban all other forms of
consumer-oriented promotional advertising of all tobacco products. See H.R. 4972, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The bill, known as the Health Protection Act of 1986, was introduced
on June 10, 1986, by Congressman Mike Synar (D-Okla.). 132 CONG. REC. H3481 (daily ed.
June 10, 1986). The bill would prohibit advertising tobacco products in print media such as
newspapers, magazines, billboards, posters, and point-of-purchase display materials. H.R.
4972, §§ 3(a), 5 (1986). Advertising through sample giveaways and sponsorship of athletic
events would also be prohibited. Id. § 5. Hearings on the bill were held on July 18, 1986, 132
CONG. REC. D855 (daily ed. July 21, 1986), and August 1, 1986, 132 CONG. REC. D938 (daily
ed. Aug. 1, 1986), and the bill most likely will be reintroduced in the 100th Congress. See
Abramson, Battle Lines Drawn in Cigarette Ad Fight, Legal Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 1.
The legislation has generated tremendous controversy in the mass media. See, e.g., Canel-
los, Scott Stapf Striking Back for Tobacco, The Industry's Happy Warrior, Pushing the Cause
in Hostile Terrain, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1986, at Dl; Hamilton, Surgeon General Supports Ban
on Ads for Tobacco Products, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1986, at Dl, col. 2; Wulf, Should Tobacco
Ads Be Banned?, Wash. Post, July 2, 1986, at A3, col. 2. Proponents of the ban argue that it
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Trade Commission authority to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the advertising of cigarettes, ' and the district courts jurisdiction to
enjoin violations of the Act.7" It also requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to submit to Congress an annual report on the health effects
of smoking.80
Significantly, the Act also contains a provision on preemption, section
1334, which provides that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health,
other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be re-
quired on any cigarette package.""1 Section 1334 also states that "[n]o re-
quirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-
would reduce cigarette consumption and deter nonsmokers, especially minors, from becoming
smokers. Opponents of the ban argue that prohibiting advertisements would not reduce ciga-
rette consumption and that a ban would be unconstitutional. See Bliley, Should Congress Ban
the Advertising of Tobacco Products?: No, AM. LEGION MAG., Sept. 1986, at 8; Kmiec, Should
Tobacco Advertising Be Banned?: The Wrong Solution, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 39; Synar,
Should Congress Ban the Advertising of Tobacco Products?: Yes, AM. LEGION MAG., Sept.
1986, at 8 [hereinafter Synar I]; Synar, Should Tobacco Advertising Be Banned?: A Habit That
Kills, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 38; see also Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 2; Note, The First
Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
632 (1985) (discussing the constitutionality of a ban).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (Supp. III 1985). In 1964 the Federal Trade Commission concluded
that cigarette advertising was deceptive and unfair and proposed to adopt a trade regulation
rule governing cigarette advertising. See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964).
The rule would have required cigarette manufacturers to include a warning of the adverse
health effects of smoking on each cigarette package and in all cigarette advertisements. Id.
Congress preempted the rule by enacting its own cigarette health warnings in the Act. The
Act, however, explicitly states that the Commission's authority to regulate unfair or deceptive
practices in cigarette advertising was not affected. See 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (Supp. III 1985).
The Commission recently charged R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company with misrepresenting,
in an "editorial" advertisement, the results of a government study on cigarette smoking and
health. See Mintz, Judge Shelves Complaint on Reynolds Tobacco Ad, Wash. Post, Aug. 7,
1986, at E2, col. 1. The advertisement, entitled "Of Cigarettes and Science," claimed that
federally funded studies indicated smoking is not as dangerous as the public has been told and
challenged the link between smoking and heart disease. Id. An administrative law judge dis-
missed part of the Commission's complaint, concluding that even if the advertisement was
inaccurate and incomplete, it was protected by the first amendment as noncommercial speech.
Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1339 (1982).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. III 1985).
81. Section 1334 reads:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
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rettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this chapter.",12 Thus section 1334 bars states from regulating cigarette
packaging and advertising by forbidding a warning other than the warning
set forth in the Act. 83 In recent cigarette injury cases manufacturers have
argued that to allow plaintiffs to recover damages based on theories of inade-
quate warnings and advertising practices that undermine those warnings ac-
tually given would be to permit states to indirectly impose additional
warning requirements on manufacturers in violation of this provision.84
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN THE
1980's
A. The Split of Authority in the Federal Courts
In the 1980's, plaintiffs filed a second group85 of product liability lawsuits
against cigarette manufacturers. 86 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,87 a
cigarette smoker and her husband sued three cigarette companies on theories
82. Id. § 1334(b).
83. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190 (E.D. Tenn.
1985); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (D.N.J. 1984).
84. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
85. Approximately 50 cases are now pending in the courts. Ross, Court Limits Lawsuits
By Smokers, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1986, at E2, col. 1.
86. Manufacturers of tobacco products other than cigarettes are also increasingly being
sued for illnesses allegedly caused by using their products. For example, in Marsee v. United
States Tobacco Co., No. 84-2777 (D. Okla. July 2, 1986) (order dismissing case), the plaintiff
sued, seeking 37 million dollars in damages for the wrongful death of her son from oral cancer
allegedly caused by using the defendant's smokeless tobacco. The Marsee case was the first
product liability case involving smokeless tobacco to be tried by a jury. Mintz, Jury Weighs
Lawsuit Over Use of Snuff: Lawyers for Marsee, Firm Trade Barbs, Wash. Post, June 20, 1986,
at A 16, col. 1. The jury found that smokeless tobacco did not cause the oral cancer that killed
the plaintiff's son. Mintz, Tobacco Company is Cleared: Jury Decides Snuff Didn't Cause
Death, Wash. Post, June 21, 1986, at G1, col. 6. The case was considered difficult for the
tobacco industry to win because the defendant had advertised on television and its products
carried no warning labels. Id. at G2, col. 4. Legislation prohibiting the advertisement of
smokeless tobacco products on radio and television had been passed at the time of the trial but
had not yet taken effect. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4402(f) (West Supp. 1986). One of the following
warning labels is now required on smokeless tobacco packages and in print advertisements for
smokeless tobacco:
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH
LOSS
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO
CIGARETTES
Id. § 4402(a). See 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 201 (using smokeless
tobacco increases the risk of cancers of the oral cavity).
87. 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
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of strict liability, intentional tort, negligence, and breach of warranty."a The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to warn adequately consumers of
the health risks of smoking and that they advertised their products in a man-
ner that rendered ineffective those warnings actually given.8 9 The defend-
ants argued that compliance with the Act preempted state law claims based
on labeling and advertising. 90
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected
this preemption defense.91 The court found that state case law was not ex-
pressly preempted by the Act because state law was not a "requirement" or a
"prohibition" that could be superseded by the Act's preemption clause. 92
The court also determined that the Act did not impliedly preempt state case
law.93 The court reasoned that the Act's purpose was to establish a uniform
warning so that cigarette manufacturers would not be subjected to varying
state warning requirements.94 The court concluded that allowing plaintiffs
to bring state law product liability suits against manufacturers would not
undermine this purpose.95
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
district court,9 6 holding that state law claims challenging the adequacy of
88. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1148. This argument is based on the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2, which authorized Congress to preempt state law.
Congress may expressly preempt state law by including preemption language in a statute.
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Absent express preemption, federal law
may impliedly preempt state law if Congress indicates its intent to "occupy a given field."
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Congress' intent to occupy a given
field, and thus supersede state law, can be determined from the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme, from the dominance of the federal interest, or from the goals of, and obliga-
tions imposed by, the federal statute. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation,
state law may still be preempted if it conflicts with federal law. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
Such conflict occurs where it is impossible to comply simultaneously with state and federal law
or where state law interferes with the accomplishment of congressional purposes and objec-
tives. Id. Federal statutes can preempt both state statutes and state case law. Sperry v. Flor-
ida, 373 U.S. 329, 403 (1963). There is, however, a presumption against preemption.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). See generally Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at
1150-53 (discussing preemption principles).
91. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1148.
92. Id. at 1155-56.
93. Id. at 1157-70.
94. Id. at 1169. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
95. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169-70. Contra Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
96. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563). The tobacco industry predicted that the
Third Circuit's opinion would end the rash of law suits filed by smokers and their families.
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the warnings on cigarette packages and the advertising practices of the to-
bacco industry were precluded by the Act because the claims would conflict
with the Act's goals and purposes. The Third Circuit agreed that the Act
did not expressly bar state law claims, although it did hold that the Act
impliedly preempted those claims "relating to smoking and health that chal-
lenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propri-
ety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of
cigarettes.",9 7 The Act also implicitly precluded claims that depend for suc-
cess "on the assertion that a party bore the duty to provide a warning to
consumers in addition to the warning Congress has required on cigarette
packages.",18 The court determined that allowing plaintiffs to bring claims
based on these theories would conflict with the Act's purposes of warning
the public of the health risks of smoking and protecting the interest of the
nation's economy.99
Opinions by other courts on the preemption defense conflict. The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected this defense
in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., o a case brought by the family of a man
who died from lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking cigarettes. The
court in Palmer agreed with the district and appellate courts in Cipollone
that the Act does not expressly bar state law claims. 101 The court in Palmer
agreed, however, with the district court in Cipollone that by passing the Act
Congress did not impliedly preempt private "rights and remedies tradition-
ally defined solely by state law. ' 10 2 The court rejected the defendants' argu-
ments that tort suits frustrate the Act's purpose and that it would be
Ross, Court Limits Lawsuits by Smokers, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1986, at El, col. 6. Tobacco
company stocks soared in response to the ruling. Id.
97. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (footnote omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further development
of the parties' claims and to determine which claims were preempted. Id. at 188. The United
States Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. 55 U.S.L.W. 3470
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
100. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-1525 (1st Cir. May 5,
1986).
101. Id. at 1174. The court noted that although Congress could have included a savings
clause explicitly preserving state law actions, the omission of a savings clause was not as proba-
tive as the omission of a clause explicitly barring state law claims because there is a presump-
tion against the preemption of state law. Id. at 1174-75. Congress included such a savings
clause explicitly preserving common law claims in the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act of 1986. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4406(c) (West Supp. 1986) ("Nothing in
this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law
to any other person.").
102. Id. at 1176 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir.
1986)).
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impossible to comply with the Act and simultaneously be subject to tort
liability."0 3 The court reasoned that, in granting compensation to plaintiffs,
states are not imposing labeling regulations on manufacturers." Moreover,
the court noted that the Act merely requires the presence of the federal
warning and "prohibits states or the federal government from requiring any
different warnings." 10 5 It does not preclude manufacturers from choosing to
respond to potential tort liability by placing an additional warning, stronger
than that required by the Act, on cigarette packages and in cigarette
advertisements. 1
0 6
In contrast to the holding in Palmer, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee, in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 107 held that the Act does preempt state law claims. In Roysdon, a
smoker and his wife claimed that his peripheral vascular disease was caused
by years of smoking the defendant's cigarettes.10 8 They alleged that the de-
fendant's cigarettes were defective, that they were unreasonably dangerous,
and that the warnings on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements
were inadequate.' 09 The court held that the Act barred tort actions alleging
inadequacy of labeling because such actions conflicted with the Act's pur-
pose of ensuring labeling uniformity. 10 The court also observed that, under
Tennessee law, cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous in view of the
widespread public knowledge of their harmful properties."'




107. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20,
1986).
108. Id. at 1190. Before trial the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the warnings on
cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements were inadequate. Id. The court directed a
verdict for the cigarette manufacturer on the claim that the defendant's cigarettes were unrea-
sonably dangerous, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their prima facie case. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court reasoned that imposing tort damages on manufacturers for inadequate ciga-
rette labeling would conflict with the Act's purpose of ensuring labeling uniformity by permit-
ting a state to "achieve indirectly, through exposure to tort liability, what it could not achieve
directly through legislation .... [E]xposing a manufacturer to potential damages on the basis
of its warning label is a way of requiring a more stringent label." Id. at 1191.
111. Id. at 1192. The court noted that in Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits, 664
S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984), the Tennessee Supreme Court "took judicial notice of the wide-
spread public understanding of the dangers inherent in alcohol." Id. The court further ob-
served that Tennessee tort law incorporates comment i to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states that to be unreasonably dangerous,
[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasona-
bly dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dan-
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B. The Rationale for Rejecting the Preemption Defense
The district court in Cipollone and the court in Palmer both found that the
Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempted causes of action based on
health warnings and advertising practices.' 2 In rejecting the preemption
defense both courts noted that federal statutes have preempted state law in
many areas." 3 There is a presumption, however, against preemption be-
cause state law is "often the result of many generations of judicial develop-
ment.,, '4 The presumption against preemption is particularly strong where
preemption would leave a plaintiff without an adequate remedy for alleged
violations of his or her state-created rights.' Because section 1334 of the
Act does not expressly prohibit damage suits, holding that the Act precludes
plaintiffs' claims with respect to warnings and advertisements would deprive
plaintiffs of the opportunity to bring such claims where Congress has pro-
vided no remedy for violations of these rights."
16
In addressing the express preemption defense the district court in Cipol-
lone noted that, under section 1334, Congress preempted state regulation of
cigarette labeling and advertising.' Nevertheless, the court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that state tort law has a direct regulatory impact on an
industry by redistributing losses caused by certain products from injured in-
dividuals to the products' manufacturers." 8 As the court in Palmer noted,
however, compensating plaintiffs in the form of damage awards for alleged
injuries is not direct state action in the same way that awarding plaintiffs
injunctive relief would be." 9
The court in Palmer and the district court in Cipollone also concluded
gerous to alcoholics. . . . Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful ....
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965)).
112. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1172 (D. Mass. 1986); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1170-71 (D.N.J. 1984).
113. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1174; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1152.
114. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1152; see Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1174.
115. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153.
116. If Congress amended the Act to expressly preempt future state law claims, it could
establish a tobacco compensation fund to avoid the problem of leaving plaintiffs without a legal
remedy for alleged violations of their rights. Such a fund could be financed through the impo-
sition of a "safety tax" on cigarettes. See Garner, supra note 3, at 1463-64.
117. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153; accord Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
118. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1155. But see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("[R]egulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can
be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.").
119. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (D. Mass. 1986).
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that the Act does not impliedly preempt state law claims. 120 After an analy-
sis of the Act's legislative history the Cipollone court found that Congress
intended only to prohibit states from regulating cigarette labeling and adver-
tising, 12 1 and not to foreclose plaintiffs' state law remedies. The court noted
that plaintiffs brought product liability suits against cigarette manufacturers
before the Act was passed 1 22 and that the Act's legislative history indicated
that Congress was aware of these suits. 123 Thus, at the time of enactment,
Congress could have statutorily barred plaintiffs from recovering damages
had Congress intended to deny plaintiffs this remedy.
12 4
The district court in Cipollone and the court in Palmer also determined
that state tort law did not conflict with the Act because compliance with
both is possible. 125 These courts reasoned that the Act makes it illegal to
omit the prescribed health warning from cigarette packages.12 6 It does not
prohibit manufacturers from putting additional warnings on cigarette pack-
ages in response to adverse jury verdicts. 127 Such an action would be the
manufacturer's choice, not an action required by state law, and thus, would
not conflict with the Act. 128 Ironically, placing warnings on tobacco prod-
ucts in addition to those required by state and federal labeling statutes could
benefit manufacturers from a product liability point of view because compli-
ance with a labeling statute or regulation is usually not an absolute defense
to liability, but only evidence of due care.
129
C. The Rationale for Applying the Preemption Defense
Both the Third Circuit in Cipollone and the court in Roysdon determined
120. Id. at 1173; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1170-71.
121. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1161. At the time the Act was passed bills were pending
before several state legislatures that would have required health warnings in cigarette adver-
tisements. Id.
122. Id. at 1161-62. See supra note 4.
123. The court stated that "although neither the statute itself nor the final committee re-
ports explicitly address the status of these cases after passage of the Act, congressional debate
recognized their continued existence." Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1162.
124. Id.
125. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168.
126. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(Supp. 1 1984).
127. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
128. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
129. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1178 ("Many courts have held that compliance with
federal labeling requirements under other similar statutes does not immunize a defendant from
suit. A jury is still free to find that a reasonable person would have included additional warn-
ings.") (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965)
("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a
finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
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that the Act precluded state law actions based on allegedly inadequate
health warnings. 3o In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit held in
Cipollone that state law claims challenging the sufficiency of the health
warnings on cigarette packages and the advertising practices of cigarette
companies are implicitly preempted by the Act because they would conflict
with its goals and purposes.' 3' The court accepted the defendants' assertion
that state law damage actions are regulatory and thus conflict with the Act's
purposes by imposing requirements on manufacturers different from those in
the Act. 1
32
Like the Third Circuit in Cipollone, the Roysdon court concluded that the
Act preempts state law claims based on the adequacy of cigarette warn-
ings. 133 Although the court found that the Act "does not explicitly prohibit
state common law tort actions based on labeling," it determined that Con-
gress' intent to prohibit common law actions could "be implied from the
structure and purpose of the Act."' 34 The court reasoned that the purpose
of section 1331 of the Act was twofold-to inform the public of the adverse
health effects of smoking and to ensure uniformity of cigarette labeling.,
3
1
Exposing cigarette manufacturers to tort liability for inadequate labeling
would not conflict with the first congressional objective of informing the
public, but it would conflict with the second objective of ensuring labeling
uniformity.'3 6 Exposing cigarette manufacturers to liability on the basis of
an inadequate warning label can be viewed as a way for states to indirectly
require a more stringent warning label than the one Congress required and
therefore thwart congressional intent to secure uniform labeling.
137
IV. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. The Courts' Role
The cigarette smoking injury cases litigated in the 1980's are significant
because of their potential to influence future cigarette product liability law.
Preventing plaintiffs from challenging the adequacy of the health warnings
130. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
131. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
132. Id.
133. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190-91.
134. Id. at 1190 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 1191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
136. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191. See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (The Act preempts
claims based on warnings and advertisements because they conflict with Congress' "carefully
drawn balance between the purposes of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking
and protecting the interests of national economy.") (citations omitted).
137. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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or the advertising practices of the tobacco industry would narrow the realm
of plaintiffs' possible legal theories. It would also provide the tobacco indus-
try with another defense in addition to the plaintiff conduct defenses of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk.' 31 Thus, application of the
preemption defense would aid in continuing the trend of immunity of to-
bacco manufacturers from tort liability.'
39
Yet, allowing plaintiffs to challenge the adequacy of the health warnings
and the advertising practices of tobacco manufacturers would give plaintiffs
only the "right to present their claims for adjudication."" Permitting these
claims to be raised would not ensure their success because overcoming the
assumption of risk defense remains a major problem for plaintiffs.' 4 ' Never-
theless, plaintiffs should be allowed to present these claims to juries because
of the strong presumption against the preemption of state law by federal
law. 1
42
Moreover, whether the courts allow plaintiffs to sue on theories of inade-
quate warnings and misleading advertisements should not affect suits based
on the legal theories that plaintiffs have used previously because the Act
applies to warnings and advertisements only, not to common law and statu-
tory causes of action. 143 The effect of foreclosing plaintiffs' suits concerning
advertising practices and warnings, however, may be to make it more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to bring claims based on negligence, breach of warranty,
and fraud because of the interrelationship between these causes of action and
cigarette advertising and labeling.'" Thus, suits filed in the 1950's and
1960's addressed the problems of advertising and labeling under breach of
138. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
140. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1171.
141. See id. at 1148, 1171. The district court in Cipollone stated "that it will be extremely
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the present warning is inadequate to inform of the dangers,
whatever they may be. However, the difficulty of proof cannot preclude the opportunity to be
heard, and affording that opportunity will not undermine the purposes of the Act." Id. at
1148.
142. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
143. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1156 n.7. See generally Jakobi, supra note 5, at 10 (The
Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone is "wrongly perceived by many to have ended the right to
bring common law tort suits against manufacturers.").
144. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1162 n.10. As the court stated:
It should be noted that [the cases filed in the 1950's and 1960's] address the problems
of labeling and advertising under the aegis of breach of warranty, negligence, or
fraud causes of action. Indeed so intertwined is labeling or advertising with any tort
causes of action based upon design defects, that the position of defendants ... that
the Act permitted all tort actions except those based upon labeling and advertising is
absurd. Labels and advertisements constitute a manufacturer's public statements
about its product; they are a necessary component of any common law tort analysis.
Id. (citations omitted).
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warranty, negligence, and fraud theories.145
Under Cipollone, smokers cannot challenge either the adequacy of the
health warnings on cigarette packages or the advertising practices of the to-
bacco industry, while under Roysdon, smokers cannot bring claims based on
allegedly inadequate warnings. Under Palmer, however, plaintiffs can still
bring these challenges.146 The Palmer and Roysdon cases are currently on
appeal' 47 and the Supreme Court recently denied the plaintiffs' writ of certi-
orari in Cipollone. 148 Affirmance of Palmer by the First Circuit or reversal
of Roysdon by the Sixth Circuit would lead to a split in the circuit courts on
the preemption issue.
Plaintiffs are likely to continue challenging the adequacy of the health
warnings on cigarette packages until the split in the federal courts is re-
solved. Plaintiffs will have little difficulty establishing a prima facie case that
cigarettes are harmful in light of numerous Surgeon General's reports show-
ing the connection between smoking and disease.149 In fact, the warnings
currently required on cigarette packages explicitly list the various diseases
smoking causes.150 Yet, these more detailed warnings also help manufactur-
ers establish the defense of assumption of risk.151 Moreover, public health
advertising campaigns by the American Cancer Society and the American
Medical Association put smokers on notice of the dangerous nature of
cigarettes. 
15 2
Plaintiffs also are likely to continue challenging defendants' advertising
practices. Recently, the courts,' 5 3 Congress, 154 and the media155 have fo-
145. Id. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296-97 (3d
Cir. 1961) (alleged warranties appeared in advertisements and manufacturer had duty to warn
consumers of health risks of smoking); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170,
173-74 (1st Cir. 1956) (advertisements were allegedly fraudulent), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875
(1958).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
147. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), appeal docketed,
No. 86-1525 (1st Cir. May 5, 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986).
148. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
149. See, e.g., 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT (cancer), supra note 2; 1983 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT (cardiovascular disease), supra note 2; 1984 SURGEON GENERAL'S RE-
PORT (chronic obstructive lung disease), supra note 2.
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. III 1985); see also supra note 74.
151. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Wallack, Mass Media and Drinking, Smoking, and Drug Taking, 9 CON-
TEMP. DRUG PROBS. 49, 57-60 (1980) (reviewing the history and success of public service
advertising campaigns against tobacco use). But see H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(15)
(1986) (tobacco product advertising "undermines the credibility of government and private
health education campaigns against smoking").
153. See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Palmer v.
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cused a great deal of attention on whether tobacco companies' advertising
practices are misleading and whether these practices stimulate more people,
especially young people, to use tobacco products. Some evidence supports
the tobacco industry's claim that advertising causes brand switching rather
than total market growth from new users. 156 Other evidence, however, indi-
cates that advertising stimulates more people to smoke than the number of
smokers who die or quit every year. 17 Under a narrow reading of the Third
Circuit's ruling in Cipollone, plaintiffs cannot challenge any of the cigarette
companies' advertising practices, even those advertising practices allegedly
directed toward encouraging minors to smoke, because the Act preempts all
claims based on warnings and advertisements."' 8
If the federal courts ultimately adopt the cigarette manufacturers' theory
that state tort liability is regulatory in effect, this ruling may have broad
implications for other product liability cases. It could set a precedent for
allowing manufacturers to use preemption as a defense to plaintiffs' claims
with respect to warnings and advertisements whenever a federal labeling
statute requires that states not impose any other requirements on manufac-
turers.1 59 In other words, such a theory could virtually eliminate state prod-
Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
154. See H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(14) (1986) ("[T]obacco product advertising
deceptively portrays the use of tobacco as socially acceptable and healthful .... "); see also
supra note 77.
155. See supra note 77.
156. See Bliley, supra note 77, at 8 ("[T]obacco advertising is not designed to induce people
to begin smoking. Its major action, according to the Surgeon General's 1979 Report, 'seems to
be to shift brand preferences .... "). Id.
157. See Synar I, supra note 77, at 8. As the author notes,
[i]f [it] is true [that advertising does not encourage smoking], why is the tobacco
industry spending over $2 billion annually on advertising-more than any other
product in America? According to the industry lobbyists, they are only trying to
encourage smokers to switch brands. But only 10 percent of all smokers change
brands each year. That means the tobacco industry is spending $355 for each smoker
who switches.
Id. Three hundred fifty thousand smokers die annually in the United States from cigarette
related diseases, Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 2, at 502, and 1,500,000 quit yearly. Id. at 503.
Ninety percent of regular smokers have attempted to quit. Jakobi, supra note 5, at 13. Ap-
proximately 33% of all Americans smoke. Brandt, Foreword to 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 2, at ix.
158. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986) (the Act
"preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking and health that challenge either
the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with
respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes") (footnote omitted).
159. See generally Tribe, Anti-Cigarette Suits: Federalism With Smoke and Mirrors, THE
NATION, June 7, 1986 (criticizing Third Circuit's opinion in Cipollone as being harmful to
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uct liability suits in areas where federal health and safety standards exist."
B. The Congress' Role
Whatever Congress intended, the Act has provided manufacturers with a
defense to tort claims based on warnings and advertisements that has been
accepted by some courts and rejected by others. Assuming that Congress
wants to resolve this controversy, several options are available to it. Con-
gress could amend the Act by adding a preemption clause to prohibit plain-
tiffs from recovering damages for tobacco-related illnesses if Congress
intends that plaintiffs not recover.16' Alternatively, Congress could amend
the Act to include a savings clause preserving plaintiffs' state law reme-
dies. 162 By failing to include either of these clauses, Congress originally may
have intended that the courts continue to decide whether plaintiffs should
recover damages.1 63 In the absence of an explicit statement of legislative
intent in the form of a preemption or a savings clause, it is left to the courts
to decide whether plaintiffs can recover for injuries allegedly caused by inad-
equate cigarette warnings and deceptive advertisements."
V. CONCLUSION
The impact of the cases holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act preempts claims against cigarette manufacturers that chal-
lenge either the adequacy of the warnings on cigarette packages or the adver-
tising practices of the tobacco industry is limited because the cases expressly
federalism concerns because case limits right of states to adjudicate product liability suits in
areas where federal health and safety standards apply).
160. See generally id.
161. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) (example of preemption
clause); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) & (c)(1)
(1982) (same).
162. See, e.g., Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 4406(c) (West Supp. 1986) ("Nothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at
common law or under State statutory law to any other person.").
163. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1162-66 (D.N.J. 1984) (cit-
ing congressional debate on the Act as proof that Congress intended to permit plaintiffs' prod-
uct liability lawsuits to continue); see also Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171,
1179 (D. Mass. 1986). The Palmer court cites congressional debate and statutory language
from the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, which requires
health warnings to appear on smokeless tobacco product packages and in smokeless tobacco
advertisements, to show that Congress was aware of cases like Cipollone and Roysdon while the
Smokeless Tobacco Act was pending and that Congress, by including a savings clause in that
Act, intended for state law actions against smokeless tobacco manufacturers to continue. Id.
164. See Tribe, supra note 159, at 790 ("[A]s long as state law permits, the verdicts should
be left by courts where they were left by Congress: for juries to decide, based on the particular
set of circumstances in each case.").
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bar only these claims and not those based on other theories. The rulings in
these cases, however, do continue the trend of de facto immunity of tobacco
products manufacturers from civil liability and narrow the number of theo-
ries upon which plaintiffs can sue manufacturers. Moreover, foreclosing
suits based on advertisements and warnings may make it more difficult for
smokers to bring claims based on negligence, fraud, or breach of warranty
because proof of these claims often depends on manufacturers' statements in
labels and advertisements. Yet, because of the strong presumption against
federal preemption of state law, plaintiffs should be permitted to challenge
allegedly inadequate health warnings and misleading advertising practices by
tobacco manufacturers. In the absence of any clear statement of congres-
sional intent, the burden rests on the courts, and perhaps ultimately on the
United States Supreme Court, to determine whether plaintiffs can sue to-
bacco manufacturers on these other theories.
Leila B. Boulton
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